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BRIEFLY NOTED

The Cuban Prison: On 20 August, a Cuban patrol boat intercepted a vessel off the port of La Fe, near the western tip of Cuba, which was attempting to take 17 Cuban refugees to the U. S. In the gun fight which ensued, one of the refugees was killed and two were wounded. This merely serves as a reminder that, whether in Berlin or in Cuba, the authorities are obliged to use ruthless methods to keep the population within their control. If such methods were not employed, the resulting mass exodus would serve as a living expression of the opinions which may not be expressed through a free vote.

Russian Private Enterprise in Guinea: Of the 3,000 odd Soviet technicians now engaged in various activities in Guinea, a number are in charge of running the nationalized diamond mines in upper Guinea. Twenty of these were arrested in July 1961 after the Guinea police discovered that they were smuggling industrial diamonds by sending them out of the country in small packages of locally grown coffee beans. The Guinean government has been anxious to prevent this story from being known particularly at this time when an effort is being made to stamp out growing corruption in the country. The Russians have tried to persuade the Guinea authorities to send the smugglers back to Russia for detention.

Soviet Science Stumbles: Although the two events are not known to be directly related in any way, we note the comeback of Trofim D. Lysenko, Stalin's tsar of genetics, biology, agronomy and botany and the defection of Dr. Mikhail A. Klotchko, outstanding Soviet authority in inorganic chemistry occurred within one week in mid-August 1961. Lysenko was re-elected president of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences on 8 August, a position from which he had been removed in 1956. Lysenko's genetics, derived from Marxism rather than research, have earned him the contempt of the world scientific community. Dr. Klotcho's reputation, in his field, is, on the other hand, widely respected. His defection on 15 August in Ottawa, Canada, in his own words, came about because "I could not carry out pure research where the scientist is constantly hampered by political considerations." This contrast between the promotion of the politically sound Lysenko and the defection of the scientifically dedicated Klotcho affords us an excellent opportunity to cast doubt on the much vaunted "advanced" state of Soviet science. (See ADDENDUM Sheet)

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28 August 1961

SPECIAL NOTE

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Please make available to local [REDACTED] representatives, at
your discretion,

Khrushchev's Blueprint for Communist Conquest

forwarded with Book Dispatch #2776 to Chiefs, Certain Stations and Bases.

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Background: The question of Chinese representation in the United Nations will be twelve years old this fall. Until now there has been little need for wide understanding of the question; the UN itself has preferred not to examine it. But during the past year a sufficient number of UN member nations have expressed a desire for such an examination that a general debate of the question during the forthcoming 16th regular session of the UN General Assembly is now widely anticipated.

Since the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) first raised the question in a communication to the General Assembly in November 1949, the issue involved has been over-simplified. For the Communists, the issue is the continued merit of the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) versus the merit of the CPR as the legitimate China UN representative. The Communist side, through the years, has concentrated its efforts in the argument that the CPR regime has completely replaced the GRC as the rightful government of China, and that the GRC is merely a "corpse" sustained by the US on Taiwan. With the issue reduced to these terms, the relative size of the territories and populations governed by the CPR and GRC respectively has tended to obscure all other considerations.

The US, on the other hand, has claimed that the GRC is the continuing political entity that became a founding member of the UN in 1945 and is yet the legal government of China. The US also explained that the CPR does not qualify for UN membership. On the basis of these two fundamental arguments the US has successfully presented its annual moratorium against General Assembly debate of the China question.

There are only two ways under the UN Charter and Rules of Procedure by which the GPR can gain admission to the UN: (1) admission as a new member nation, and (2) admission as a replacement delegation for the GRC via an Assembly-approved credentials decision disavowing the GRC's UN credentials. The CPR has consistently refused to apply for new nation membership. Thus, the main Communist thrust this fall is expected to be aimed - as in all 11 past years - at the credentials approach.

The main Communist effort will doubtless be made in the regular session scheduled to begin on 19 September. It is quite possible that as last year, a Soviet Union or Soviet-inspired request will be presented calling for inclusion of the China representation question on the Assembly agenda. Stations should be on the alert for this Soviet action, which occurred on 5 September last year.

This request would then be considered by the Assembly's General, or Steering, Committee around the time of the 19 September session opening. In the absence of a US-sponsored moratorium against approval of the Soviet request, the Committee will undoubtedly schedule the question for inclusion in the agenda for Assembly debate this fall.

The Communists' effort to secure the CPR's admission to the UN is not a simple demand that it be admitted to that body as a new nation. What they have insisted upon, and will probably demand this fall, is admission of the CPR as a replacement of the GRC delegation. This would involve a decision by the General Assembly disavowing the credentials of the GRC as a charter member of the organization thus depriving that government of any UN-backed international

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standing. As heir to the GRC, the CPR could be expected to claim China's place on the Security Council as a permanent member with full veto power.

Either before or at the time such a demand is made, it is probable that the US will counter by seeking to have the China question declared an "important question" which, under UN General Assembly Rule of Procedure 18, would require a two-thirds vote for passage of any resolution arising from debate of the question. (NOTE: Please read State Action Circular 253, dated 11 August 1961, for full explanation of the "important question" tactic.)

Quotes of suitable 1961 remarks and articles by CPR leaders and news media are attached to this guidance. Also attached is a translation from a May 1961 French magazine article. See also the following Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance items: 285, dated 29 August 1960; 400, dated 19 June 1961 and 420, dated 14 August 1961.

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28 August 1961

421. The Draft of the New CPSU Program

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Background: On 30 July, the CPSU released a 47,000 word draft of its new party program, adopted by the Central Committee for submission to the 22nd party Congress, scheduled to open in Moscow on 17 October. Formally, this new program is to replace the old party program, which is now largely obsolete, adopted in 1919. That earlier program, written in the midst of civil war and overshadowed by the pressing difficulties of the newly established Soviet regime, was in the main limited to a statement of general principles, followed by a fairly meager catalog of short-range objectives. The new draft, however, is far more ambitious: it attempts to cover the past, the present and at least 20 years of the future in a great wealth of detail, treating political, economic, cultural and administrative matters. It claims applicability not only for the Soviet Union, but for the other Bloc countries and the free world, too.

The principal characteristics of the new program may be summarized as follows:

1. It reflects the dangerous over-confidence of Khrushchev and his followers in a language possible only in a totalitarian country, where a document of this kind is safe from public criticism or questioning--over-confidence based on the conviction that communism is the irresistible wave of the future and that all other forms of government and society are doomed, thereby sharply increasing the danger of war by miscalculation.
2. It reiterates the well-worn formula of "peaceful coexistence" and confirms that war between Communist and "imperialist" countries is "not fatally inevitable," provided, of course, that the latter peacefully surrender. It also endorses again "wars of liberation," alleging that all wars serving the Communist cause are "just."
3. It promises the populations of the Soviet Union a long, very detailed list of material incentives and tangible advantages, ranging from higher wages to better supply of consumer goods and from rural electrification to apartments for newlyweds.

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4. It boasts of surpassing the capitalist countries, especially the US, within the next 20 years, in gross national product, industrial and agricultural output, productivity of labor and standard of living --making, however, the fulfillment of these and all other material promises dependent upon peace and disarmament.

5. It stresses the leading role of the CPSU in the World Communist movement by (a) claiming that the Soviet Union alone is now "building communism" ("Communism" is considered the ultimate goal, while the other Bloc countries are merely building "socialism"), (b) minimizing the significance of the Chinese revolution and of the achievements of other Bloc and non-Bloc Communist Parties, (c) providing a blueprint for all other Communist Parties, based on an authoritative analysis of the capitalist world and its inevitable downfall, (d) omitting any reference to the Moscow Declaration 1960 which proclaimed the independence and equality of all Communist Parties, on either side of the iron curtain.

6. It omits the name of Stalin, even in the context of actions for which he was unquestionably responsible and mentions only Lenin by name, ignoring Mao Tse Tung, Khrushchev, or any other leader.

Massive exploitation of the draft and of its alleged impact on both Communist and non-Communist audiences by all Communist propaganda media stresses the fact that the Communists consider this not only an important text for policy direction and indoctrination of their own followers, but a major propaganda weapon aimed at neutral and "imperialist" countries as well. Within 24 hours after the publication of the draft, radio Moscow and many other Communist media started this build-up (disregarding the obvious fact that nobody could be expected to render an intelligent judgement of a paper of this length and complexity within a few hours after it was published). A PRAVDA correspondent from New York, for instance, reported under the title "Despondency and Confusion" that the rulers of the Free World have no answer to the "calm and wise words of the draft program, imbued with an invincible faith in the triumph of communism." Radio Moscow domestic service claimed: "Comments in the press by representatives of U.S. Government circles and a number of other political leaders are full of undisguised alarm and concern. None of them risks doubting the reality and attainability of the plans of our people."

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
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Innumerable other Communist news reports and commentaries stressed the impression the draft made in other parts of the world, not even omitting West Germany (even though it might have suited their pattern of vilification against Chancellor Adenauer better, if they could have claimed that his "Nazi-revanchist dictatorship" had suppressed the news of the program altogether.) Communist propaganda also repeatedly boasted of the fact that The New York Times had reprinted the full text of the draft--even though this might have reminded their audiences that they are hardly ever allowed to see the text of non-Communist documents or policy statements.

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422. INTER-AMERICAN COOPERATION: The Act of Punta del Este



Background: All members of the Organization of American States (OAS) signed a broad charter for economic and social reform at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on 17 August 1961, except Cuba, whose representative, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, however, attended the nearly three weeks of deliberation, and The Dominican Republic, which is still under diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed by the OAS last year. The Act of Punta del Este is the most far reaching program of economic development ever drawn up by the United States and foreign nations. It calls for a twenty billion dollar investment over a ten year period. More than half of this sum, some in low interest loans, will come from the United States Government. The rest will come from international agencies, Western European and private sources, both European and North American. Hence, the plan represents not only an ambitious schedule by the United States Government, but is the first example of massive coordinated public and private Free World assistance to developing nations.

The reform goals of the Act of Punta del Este are addressed to both fundamental general social needs and to certain specific problems. The general goals are to achieve land and tax reforms, aimed at the redistribution of land holdings, now concentrated in the hands of a minority, and redistribution of the national income and the sharing of the costs of social services by all members of the population. The specific problems addressed include; six years of free schooling for all children, literacy for the fifty million illiterates in the hemisphere, eradication of malaria, large-scale public housing, and potable water for more than half of the population now exposed to polluted water supplies.

An additional feature of the Act, particularly important to most of the Latin American nations, deals with commodity pricing and trade agreements. Fluctuating commodity prices and foreign competitive markets are the bane of most of these countries who depend on the export of a very few basic crops or minerals to finance their governments and provide private as well as public capital. Therefore, they seek to stabilize their export incomes by international agreement. At Punta del Este, the United States, which consumes most of the Latin American exports, said it would join a new agreement on coffee, the basic export of Colombia and Brazil, and consider joining the agreement on tin, Bolivia's principal export.

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While the other delegates concentrated on these economic problems, Cuba's Economic Minister, "Che" Guevara devoted his efforts to politics. He attempted to convince the other Latin American representatives by public speeches and private lobbying, that Cuba should be treated as a cooperative member of the OAS community, that the extensive subversive activities of Cuba throughout the area were a figment of "Yanqui" imagination and that the differences between Cuba and the United States were matters of concern to those two countries alone and not a hemisphere problem. This approach met with some success. Guevara was praised by the Brazilian representative for his "constructive" work, and, following the conference, he received a decoration from the Brazilian government. However, the Cuban currency confiscation (See Item #415, Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance #71, dated 14 August 1961) appears to have caused concern among foreigners about doing business with Cuba and to have revealed clearly that the new "reasonable" approach of the Cubans is dictated by the economic plight that totalitarian controls have brought to Cuba. On 21 August, Radio Mambi, ordinarily one of Castro's most strident propaganda organs, broadcast dramatic news of the plight. Radio Mambi pointed out that because of acute shortages of products and the new currency program, people are being forced to present only peso bills in payment even for small purchases. Mambi asks, "if a person earning three pesos a day has to spend one peso each time he goes to the store, because no small change is available, how can he possibly make out?" On the same day as the Radio Mambi broadcast, the representatives of 26 nations maintaining diplomatic establishments in Havana signed a joint protest demanding the return of equivalent new pesos for the old pesos they were forced to surrender on 6 August. The Cuban government not only has held these funds for longer than originally promised but has announced a restrictive schedule of repayment when such repayment actually takes place.

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
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
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425X1C10b The Berlin Crisis: Encouraging Communist Opposition



Background: In the morning hours of 13 August, the East German regime, supported by two or three Soviet divisions, used tanks, barbed wire and machine guns, to seal off West Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev's consent to such a drastic and provocative measure, coming after several years of pleading by Comrade Ulbricht (who has steadfastly claimed that he could not compete with West Berlin as long as the Berlin escape hatch continued to drain the cream of his industrial and professional manpower), shows the extent of deterioration in East Germany. To have risked provoking the West at a time when he was seeking negotiations, to invite an anti-Communist uprising in East Germany, and to disillusion many a hitherto sympathetic neutral indicate that Khrushchev considered Ulbricht's regime to be on the verge of complete collapse.

While Mr. Khrushchev's precipitous action has met with the inevitable echoes of approbation in Bloc propaganda, it is not hard to imagine, that among Communist Parties everywhere, the idea of supporting Germans - albeit Communist Germans - at the risk of atomic war, will not arouse great enthusiasm. Meanwhile, neutralist opinion, which prior to Khrushchev's Berlin demarche had held Western intransigence as much to blame as Russian aggression, appalled by Khrushchev's reckless resort to force, has begun to regard the Western position with greater sympathy and understanding. 25X1C10b



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Background: No sooner had the Congo gained its independence on 30 June 1960 than Soviet Russia and her satellites, Czechoslovakia in particular, moved in with every means at their disposal, quite certain that the extensive groundwork, carried out for the past few years, particularly in the field of penetration and subversion, would rapidly turn the Congo into another Soviet pawn and introduce another form of foreign domination in a newly independent African country. Under Patrice Lumumba, the Congo's first Prime Minister, whose experience in international politics was very limited, the fledgling Congo government was overrun by Communist advisors and the country flooded with tons of propaganda leaflets and pamphlets. Faced with an army mutiny, which was largely Communist inspired, and the presence of Belgian troops who had entered the Congo to protect Belgian residents, Lumumba appealed on 10 July 1960 to the UN for military assistance in the mistaken belief that he could use UN forces to suppress his political enemies and solidify his political power. The UN, however, quite normally refused to take sides in what was a purely internal quarrel and, when Lumumba discovered that the UN was not about to act as his executive agent in order to extend his authority and dislodge his political opponents, he called directly upon the Soviet Bloc for assistance, thus providing an entering wedge for unilateral Soviet intervention.

Calculated to undermine the effort of the UN, the unilateral policy of the Soviets in the Congo was designed to press their initial advantage by enhancing the build-up of the Communists with the addition of military support. The net result of this Soviet intervention and of Communist support enabled Lumumba to defy the UN, seriously impeding its activities and thus thwarting the attempts by the Congolese to develop some degree of order and working institutions. The final blow came in early September when Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's deputy, appealed to Communist China to send volunteers, arms, ammunition, planes, artillery, tanks, funds and food. The Communists thus overplayed their hand with such a blatant build-up and with such an obvious grab for power that, for the Congolese people, a change of government appeared to be the only way to avoid reversion to colonial status. President Kasavubu, in the proper exercise of his constitutional authority, therefore dismissed the Lumumba government and designated a new government under Joseph Ileo. Lumumba and his followers were unwilling to allow presentation of the new government for Parliamentary approval, however, and their continued illegal agitation against this government threatened to return the whole country to chaos. A military coup, designed to neutralize all factions temporarily, was therefore carried out by Col. Mobutu on 14 September. The Soviets continued their determined effort to paralyze the UN by refusing to contribute funds for the Congo operation and by insisting on the withdrawal of the UN troops from that country. Conditions in the Congo remained unstable. Patrice Lumumba was assassinated in early 1961 and Gizenga maintained an illegal separatist regime in Stanleyville.

The basic effort of the UN throughout this entire turbulent life of the Congo Republic has continued to be to assist the Congolese to reunify their country under a government approved by parliament and to build the Congo into a viable and stable state. (The UN effort has also been useful in avoiding a clash between the major powers in the Congo.) Having realized the need for a unified central government, the Congolese parliament unanimously elected Cyrille Adoula, a progressive labor leader and ardent nationalist, on 30 July 1961 to attempt to achieve that goal. Unfortunately, although Antoine Gizenga, ostensibly dissolved his dissident government in Stanleyville after the election of Adoula, there are indications that he is still far from willing to collaborate fully with the legitimate central government. A radical opportunist who first jumped aboard Lumumba's bandwagon, he still appears to be under the influence of the numerous Soviet, Communist Chinese, East German and other foreign advisors who installed themselves in Stanleyville as alleged diplomats. In addition, he has continued to receive supplies of arms by means of flights which are not authorized by the Central government. These arms serve to reinforce the forces of General Lundula who, although having asserted his allegiance to the new central government still refuses to integrate his troops into the National Army. Such clandestine arms imports clearly violate the Security Council resolution and are reminiscent of the early days of Congolese independence when the Communists flew in large quantities of arms in order to further their own aims. 25X1C10b

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ADDENDUM

Re Briefly Noted item on "Soviet Science Stumbles" - For additional guidance on Lysenko see [REDACTED] Item #356, dated 27 February 1961 and Issue #7, Item #38, dated 16 February 1959. For stories on Klotcho and Lysenko see Press Comment, 17, 22 and 23 August 1961.

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Item 420 - The UN Debate on China, 14 August 1961 - This item was mailed to the field 28 August 1961. Attached to this issue for headquarters distribution only. ATTACHMENTS: Attachment #1 was forwarded with issue #72; Attachment #2 - A False Problem: The Recognition of Communist China, and Attachment #3 - Quotes, attached to this issue.

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- 422. INTER-AMERICAN COOPERATION: The Act of Punta del Este - D, P.
- 423. The Berlin Crisis: Encouraging Communist Opposition - C, H, O.
- 424. Lessons from the Congo - G, T, W.

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A FALSE PROBLEM: THE RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA

by Claude Barmel

(From the French-language periodical Est et Ouest, Paris, No. 258, 16-31 May 1961, pages 1 - 4.)

From time to time, someone raises the question: Should the Western governments recognize the Chinese People's Republic? Should they accept or propose its admission to the UN? And each time some stalwart spirits are found who wonder if the answer should not be yes, if Western intransigence is not unreasonable, and if the West is not once more fighting for a position already lost, against an enemy who has tradition, common sense, and opportunity on his side.

It is in fact traditional to recognize states or governments established by force of arms against the legitimate authorities as of the moment when their de facto government has manifestly assumed real authority and as soon as they control the population and can undertake and fulfill agreements in the name of the country. Is it not against all common sense and logic for China to be represented in the UN by the Chiang Kai-shek government which rules over 6 million people on Formosa, rather than by the Peking government which dominates 600 or 650 million Chinese? Does it not approach the ridiculous to defend the presence of Taiwan China among the "Big Five", where it has the right to veto UN decisions? Is it opportune to continue to exclude Mao Tse-tung's China while both newly formed and some older governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are establishing diplomatic relations with that country, so many of them doing so that there is the risk that before long the UN General Assembly will include more supporters than opponents of the admission of Communist China? And certain persons do not fail to add, that while such a change of attitude toward Communist China might not bring its government into closer sympathy with the West, it would at least weaken its ties to the Soviet government and encourage it to pursue an independent foreign policy, which it cannot do at present owing to the kind of diplomatic bloc policy it is forced to follow.

This line of argument is used largely by those who would grant the enemy what he demands of them in the name of their own principles, instead of refusing him what he wants in the light of his principles. They are mired in the concept of international law which they have devised for themselves, a concept which they must readily admit can never be universally applied by those governments which subscribe to it, inasmuch as it is not and will not be sincerely accepted by all governments. Still, the devotion of these persons to their ideal, which serves to strengthen the Chinese Communist government in its demands, should not be exaggerated. Many of these idealists, the majority of them perhaps, would scream bloody murder if the Madrid government were to propose Spain's candidature for admission to the UN. Nonetheless, the arguments adduced in support of Communist China also work for Spain; while the charges that can be levelled against the Franco regime (assuming them to have some validity in international law) are incomparably less serious than the charges which are made, by the very people who wonder if a representative of the Peking government should not be admitted to the UN, against the regime which has imposed itself on the Chinese mainland.

History has a logic of its own, which does not always coincide with what we abusively call Cartesian logic. What seems today to be an anomaly is readily explained when we take into account the events of the last 20 years. Or is 20 years too long a span for the human memory to accommodate? Are we, by a sort of refusal to face the present, going to force society into a precipitate advance which can lead only to destruction? It is sufficient for us to remember the Second World War, and the presence of Nationalist China on the Security Council loses its supposedly artificial and arbitrary character. It again becomes intelligible. This reality is rational, to paraphrase Hegel.

A leftover, shall we say? The institutional residue of a reality that no longer exists? Perhaps. But right and justice are made up of just such leftovers: if this were not so, we would have to resign ourselves to a free-for-all. We try to create an international law: this requires at least that right of force and of victory be limited, that for might to be victorious should no longer suffice to make it right.

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No doubt the moment will always come when we will have to throw up the sponge and recognize, with Bismarck, that might precedes right. But at least this should be postponed as long as possible, until there is no alternative, and until we have kept the contemners of the right in purgatory long enough for them to have shed their old habits. And while we wait, so far from grieving over the "Chinese scandal", the promoters of international law among the society of nations should use it for the edification of their peoples.

For the rest, anyone who is shocked by the Chinese anomaly should stupify himself by taking a look at any of a number of other illogical situations. The Ukraine is a member of the UN, as is Belorussia. Are these, then, independent nations? What powers have recognized them and sent ambassadors to their governments? The Soviet government endowed them with embryonic foreign ministries, but deemed it unnecessary to carry the comedy further. A fine example of a left-over from the days when the credulous West believed in an inconceivable metamorphosis of communists into liberals, and in the transformation of the supposed Soviet "federation" into a kind of Commonwealth.

And Germany? Germany is one of the great world powers. Why isn't someone indignant because it is not represented in the UN? This too is a leftover, one which recalls that the UN consisted in the beginning of nations "united" against Germany. The division of Germany has so far made it impossible to admit that country, since to do so would sanction a division which the Germans do not accept. And so we have had to stick to the status quo. But where is the logic in resigning oneself to this sort of fatality when it concerns Germany and refusing to accept it in the case of the Chinese?

Germany, China, Korea, and Vietnam have been partitioned, and it is the "communist fact" which is responsible. Let the communists themselves, then, accept this partition and its consequences, instead of denouncing the arbitrariness of the free countries. And if they urge the numerical superiority argument in support of Peking, let us remind them that West Germany has a greater population than "democratic" Germany, and that on the basis of that argument the right to represent all Germans in the UN should fall to the Bonn government.

Finally, we fail to see what claim Communist China has to the Security Council seat now occupied by Nationalist China. This seat is reserved for a charter member, which is why it is normal to see it occupied today as it was in the beginning, despite changes in the balance of power throughout the world. China is represented in this small body, which dominates or serves as a foundation for the UN, because of the achievements of Chiang Kai-shek and because of the role he played in the founding of this institution. We fail to see how Mao Tse-tung could take over the heritage of an authority whose legitimacy he not only denies today but has denied in the past. The departure of Nationalist China from the Security Council would require a complete remoulding of the organization. One would then logically have to take into account the current balance of power in reconstituting this body. And why, in that case, should not India be preferred over China, or Japan, for that matter, or Egypt; and why should Germany not replace France? The moment the historical criterion is abandoned, we are left with other criteria which are even more arbitrary. For no one knows how to demonstrate conclusively which nations are the "great" nations, or which others are "medium" or "small" nations.

Nationalist China's right to be one of the Big Five touches on the very foundation of the institution and to dispute that right is to shake the entire edifice. Since its government has not voluntarily renounced this right, it will not be possible to take it away by force without at the same time authorizing all other governments to consider themselves no longer bound by the agreements they have entered into.

What is the objective of the Chinese communists in demanding admission to the UN and recognition of their government by the powers which are now officially ignoring it? Despite the claims of those who believe that there are basic differences between Moscow and Peking, we would not see them defending, in the UN, any policies but those of the USSR; and it is certainly not for the sake of being able to support Soviet proposals in the Security Council and in the General Assembly that they find the effort worthwhile.

What they really want is to win a victory over Chiang Kai-shek and at the same time over the entire free world. Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues refuse any recognition which is not accompanied by a withdrawal of recognition from the Formosa government. They do not say "Recognize us as the government of continental China," but "Stop recognizing the government of Formosa and consider us as the legitimate government of all China, including Formosa." In other words, they demand not only the legitimization of a de facto situation, but also assistance in the realization of their ambitions, ambitions against a government with which the West is on friendly terms.

What a triumph it would be for the communists if they could thus prove to the governments of Asia and Africa how fragile is the friendship of the Western powers, how unreliable their word.

What do they offer in return to those governments that would recognize them? Nothing. What advantages would these governments derive from the concession that recognition would constitute? None. The British government, faithful to an empiricism which is at times cynical without being clairvoyant, recognized Mao Tse-Tung's government shortly after his victory. We still may wonder what benefits Great Britain has realized from this: not even the benefit of being less injured than the rest, not even preferential treatment in trade. Under such conditions, recognition is a game for dupes.

The day the Peking authorities really want to be recognized, they will let it be known that they are ready to make the necessary concessions. One might then discuss it. In the meantime it would be ridiculous and dangerous to go to them in order to ask them their price for consenting to be recognized, since such recognition would produce no benefit, neither for France, nor for the other free nations, nor yet for the cause of world peace.

The recognition of Communist China and its admission to the UN constitute one of those pseudo-problems which the communists are skilled in exploiting against the West. There is, of course, a certain illogic in China's current UN representation, as there is in the fact that Berlin represents an enclave of the free world in the bosom of the world of servitude. This illogic comes as no surprise to people who have a sense of history. The existence of the Principality of Monaco and of the Republic of San Marino is also illogical, anachronistic, and absurd; but it embarrasses no one. Similarly, the status quo could be indefinitely prolonged in Berlin or in Formosa, without constituting any danger to world order. If these alleged abscesses seem today to be giving the world a fever, this is simply because the communist leaders (who are agitators first and foremost) need to foment unrest in the free world in order to obtain profitable concessions on this or that point and to advance their cause. This is the whole secret behind these crises; one must need to be truly ill-informed to believe them capable of unleashing a general war.

The West must discard the illusions of a too easy idealism and rediscover the old truth which taught that in the affairs of nations, as in the affairs of men, a thing is no sooner finished than it must be begun all over. This bit of wisdom would be the best armament against the undertakings of the communists, even for those persons who think the West has no ideals with which to oppose communism. If they want tranquility above all things and if they think they can get it in this world, if they are ready to make any and all concessions in order to solve all the problems once and for all because they imagine that all problems can be solved once and for all, then they may be certain that they will know no rest. They will no sooner have dearly bought their tranquility, than the communists will raise new problems, just as artificial and just as irritating as ever.

The best course, then, is simply to resign ourselves to living with these pseudo-problems typified by the Formosan problem; and to let them gradually become "good old problems", admittedly insoluble and no longer profitable to the Soviets because the whole world will have adjusted to them; the kind of problems which are far less dangerous to leave alone than to solve.

QUOTES

Liu Shao-ch'i on 30 June at the 40th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party in Peking:

"We must maintain our vigilance and continue to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against US imperialism.... Our people's aim of liberating our sacred territory of Taiwan will definitely be attained. "

Chou En-lai in June per Kyodo news agency interview with Diet member Tokuma Utsunomiya who spoke with Chou:

"Peking will never apply to the UN for participation as a new member. "

Chen I in a March interview with a Hungarian newspaperman:

"The condition which will make it possible for us to take our seat in the United Nations... is America's giving up the occupation of Taiwan and withdrawing the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait. "

Liu Ning-i in a 24 March speech to the World Peace Council in New Delhi:

"... we regard the defense of world peace and support to the struggles of the people of all countries for the winning and safeguarding of national independence as our sacred duty. "

Liu Shao-ch'i is chairman of the CPR. Chou En-lai is premier of the CPR.
Chen I is CPR foreign minister. Liu Ning-i is a top CPR labor official.

Peng Chen on 17 August to rally welcoming Brazilian Vice President Joao Goulart in Peking:

"The Kuomintang clique must be driven out of the UN immediately. "

Peking Daily Worker New Year Editorial of 1 January:

"We fully agree with the statement which... stresses that 'the danger of a new world war still persists' and 'the peoples must now be more vigilant than ever. "

Peng Chen is mayor of Peking.

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